Kant on Citizenship, Civil Independence and Enfranchisement

In the “Metaphysics of Morals” Kant claims that while subjects of the state must be treated in accords with natural laws of freedom of equality, in order for individuals to qualify to be full citizens of the state, and consequently have the right to vote they must possess “an independent position among the people.” (Kant 139) The consequence of this argument is that servants, women, minors and some kinds of tradespeople are not eligible for citizenship. The rationale behind Kant’s argument is that in order to meet the ideal of citizenship one must not depend for one’s existence and sustenance on the “arbitrary will of anyone,” but rather one must only “one’s existence and sustenance to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth.” (Kant 139) Kant calls this civil independence. This argument seems plausible and intuitive, but unfortunately its consequence is that nearly all members of modern liberal democratic societies are unqualified for full citizenship as any person who is dependent on an income for survival is necessarily dependent on the arbitrary will of others. Consequently, we must take Kant’s argument very seriously because it shows the tension between being a citizen and being a jobholder within the economic structure of modern liberal democratic societies. It may be possible to rethink citizenship in such a way that the qualifications for citizenship are compatible with the economic structure of modern liberal democratic societies, but if it is not then perhaps the economic structure of modern liberal democratic society needs to be overcome before the ideal of citizenship for all can be fully realized.

Kant reasoning as to why servants (including domestic tutors), certain tradespeople, women and minors are not eligible for full citizenship and the right to vote is that these people are dependent on the will of others because “they have to receive orders or protection from other individuals, so they do not possess civil independence.” (Kant 140) Now while Kant does not take his argument any further within the text, it seems plausible to think one reason why Kant is worried about giving full citizenship to those who do not possess civil independence is that because these individuals are dependent on others, they are in some way beholden to them, so they will easily be corrupted into voting for laws that do not represent the common interest, but rather that support the interests of those they are dependent upon. Furthermore, because individuals who do not possess civil independence are in positions in which they take orders from others, they will not have fully developed the capacity for free and independent thought, and thus they may not fully reflect when they are voting because they have not fully developed this capacity. Consequently, it seems that Kant’s argument is intuitive and plausible as those who do not possess civil independence do seem to be in danger of being ineffective, if not corrupt, citizens.

However, one issue with Kant’s argument is that he argues that academics, and carpenters both possess civil independence, but on reflection it seems that individuals in these professions would not possess civil independence. The academic does not possess civil independence as his employment and consequently his income depends on the funding of the university, and him retaining his standing within a profession, that like any profession, is full of trends, and in which positions accrue to those academics who are viewed by other academics in a positive light. Thus, academics are clearly dependent on the arbitrary will of others as their income depends on their retaining good standing within the eyes of others, and of the continued funding of post-secondary institutions. They are not dependent on any one individual’s arbitrary will, but they are dependent on the collection of arbitrary wills of the group, and the arbitrary will of the group as a whole.

Likewise, a carpenter is dependent on the arbitrary will of others for his income because in order to support himself he must sell his works, and to sell his works he must create something that will sell at a high enough price relative to the effort put in to make the work. And what will sell at this price is dependent on the arbitrary will and preference of the buying public. Kant seems to want to say that those who have no direct superior are in some way more dependent on the arbitrary will of others, than those who must sell their expertise as an independent contractor, but who do not have a direct superior, but this does not seem to be the case, because the carpenter is dependent on the arbitrary will of the buying public, just as the domestic servant is dependent on the arbitrary will of the family that he works for. However, this does not show that Kant’s argument that possession of civil independence is a qualification for citizenship is problematic, it only means that he drew erroneous conclusions from that argument.

In light of the preceding it seems that nearly all adults within modern liberal democratic societies will fail to possess civil independence as they are all dependent on the arbitrary will of individuals in that they must sell their labour either directly to the buying public, or to a company, or the state, in order to ensure the income required to sustain their own lives. Consequently, they are dependent on the arbitrary wills involved in particular companies or the state, or the buying public at large. Only the very rich who have enough capital not to be dependent on an income for their sustenance, and the farmer who grows his own food and consequently does not need to deal with the arbitrary will of the buying public possess civil independence. So according to Kant’s argument about civil independence it seems that nearly all members of modern liberal democratic societies will not possess civil independence and consequently not be eligible for citizenship.

The fact that Kant’s argument concerning civil independence suggests that nearly all citizens of modern liberal democratic society are unqualified for citizenship does not mean that Kant’s argument is implausible. However, it does demand a response from those who believe that modern liberal democratic societies can realize the ideal of citizenship for all, as it challenges the very idea that a society based on an economy of jobholders could ever realize this ideal. I am torn on the question of whether it makes sense to think that the ideal of citizenship for all could be realized in modern liberal democratic society. On one hand certain institutions such as the secret ballot make it so that even if we are dependent in our economic lives on the arbitrary will of others, we have no reason to think that we should vote for their interests, as our vote does not need to be disclosed, so it seems that in some cases at least economic dependence on the arbitrary will of others does not prevent effective citizenship. On the other hand, the economic structure of modern liberal democratic societies does not encourage people to become effective citizens. Most of our energies are put into excelling at our jobs to ensure an income for ourselves and our families. Consequently, our dependence on the arbitrary will of others for our income encourages us to be more focused on our private, professional lives, and less on the common public life we share, and thus it is not clear to me that Kant’s argument is wrong. I am not sure, but the ideal of citizenship for all may require a different societal form than the one that currently exists in the form of modern liberal democracy. Contrastingly, it may be possible to conceptualize the insights that Kant presents such that citizenship for all is compatible with modern liberal democracy. However, I do not have the answer to these questions, but by raising the questions at least we will begin to recognize that the economic bases of modern liberal democratic society is in tension with certain elements of the ideal of citizenship.

Works Cited
Kant, Immanuel. “The Metaphysics of Morals.” Political Writings. Ed. H.S Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 131-176.

Advertisements

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s